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ABSTRACT 
The endemic underuse of radio spectrum constitutes a tragedy 
of the regulatory commons.  Like other common interest tragedies, 
the outcome results from a legal or market structure that prevents 
economic actors from executing socially efficient bargains.  In 
wireless markets, innovative applications often provoke claims by 
incumbent radio users that the new traffic will interfere with 
existing services.  Sometimes these concerns are mitigated via 
market transactions, a la “Coasian bargaining.”  Other times, 
however, solutions cannot be found even when social gains 
dominate the cost of spillovers.  In the recent “LightSquared 
debacle,” such spectrum allocation failure played out.  GPS 
interests that access frequencies adjacent to the band hosting 
LightSquared’s new nationwide mobile network complained that 
the wireless entrant would harm the operation of locational 
devices.  Based on these complaints, regulators then killed 
LightSquared’s planned 4G network.  Conservative estimates 
placed the prospective 4G consumer gains at least an order of 
magnitude above GPS losses. “Win win” bargains were 
theoretically available, fixing GPS vulnerabilities while welcoming 
the highly valuable wireless innovation.   Yet transaction costs—
largely caused by policy choices to issue limited and highly 
fragmented spectrum usage rights (here in the GPS band)—proved 
prohibitive.  This episode provides a template for understanding 
market and non-market failure in radio spectrum allocation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Scarcity of private spectrum, the limitations of commons networks, 
and the waste of public spectrum go a long way toward explaining 
bottlenecks in U.S. wireless broadband.
1
 
In early 2012, regulators at the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) took an abrupt about-face with respect to a key, if 
obscure, public policy.  In 2003 and 2004, the agency had authorized the 
use of satellite frequencies, allocated to the so-called L Band, to also be 
used in terrestrial wireless systems known as “cellular.”2  The ruling 
mandated continued performance under the license’s original terms for 
satellite phone service, while permitting the carrier to additionally supply 
land-based cellular service—rights called the “ancillary terrestrial 
component”(“ATC”).  
Through a complicated set of actions involving satellite licensees, 
bankruptcy courts, investors, and additional FCC rulings, the opportunity 
permitted in 2004 was finally coming to fruition by year-end 2011.  
LightSquared, which had purchased the satellite licenses, broke ground on a 
fourth generation (“4G”) high-speed wireless broadband network using 
long-term evolution technology (“LTE”), expending some $4 billion in 
                                                     
1
 MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY 91 (2008).) [hereinafter HELLER, 
GRIDLOCK ECONOMY]. 
2
 For the history of the proceeding, see FCC, Comments in Opposition of 
Lightsquared Inc., In the Matter of LightSquared Technical Working Group Report, 
27 F.C.C. Rcd. 2203 (2012). 
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capital.
3
  The system would begin service in mid-2012 and, on completion 
by 2015, would cost a projected total of $14 billion.
4
  The network would 
potentially serve tens of millions of wireless subscribers in competition with 
mobile carriers such as Verizon Wireless and AT&T Mobility.   
The Commission lauded this competitive addition to the broadband 
marketplace.  It included the 40 MHz of L Band frequencies as a featured 
component of the National Broadband Plan, issued March 2010, which 
committed the agency to adding 300 MHz of spectrum for mobile wireless 
services, in total, by 2015.
5
    
But on February 14, 2012 the U.S. Department of Commerce 
posted a nasty valentine.  Acting on complaints from the Department of 
Defense, the Federal Aviation Administration, and other parties following 
2011 radio receiver tests, the Department of Commerce sent the FCC a 
letter stating that the emerging 4G network would interfere with GPS 
(global positioning satellite) receivers, which use frequencies adjacent to the 
L Band.
6
   Ironically, the complaint was not that LTE emissions would spill 
into the GPS band, but that GPS receivers, long made to “listen in” to 
lightly-used neighboring frequencies, would suffer diminished performance 
due to the increasing L Band traffic.
7
 
                                                     
3
 Tiffany Kary & Michael Bathon, LightSquared Files Bankruptcy After Network 
Blocked, BLOOMBERG (May 15, 2012, 12:12 AM ET), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2012-05-14/lightsquared-failed-wireless-venture-files-for-bankruptcy.html. 
4
 Scott Moritz & Olga Kharif, LightSquared Blow Gives Falcone Few Options to 
Salvage Value, BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.business 
week.com/news/2012-02-21/lightsquared-blow-gives-falcone-few-options-to-
salvage-value.html. 
5
 FCC, National Broadband Plan 87 (2010), available at http://download. 
broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan-chapter-5-spectrum.pdf  [hereinafter 
NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN]. 
6
 Letter to Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, from 
Lawrence E. Strickling, Assistant Sec’y for Commc’ns & Info., U.S. Dep’t of 
Commerce, at 2 (Feb. 14, 2012), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ 
ntia/publications/lightsquared_letter_to_chairman_genachowski__feb_14_2012.pdf 
[hereinafter NTIA Letter].  The letter’s language is quoted from Letter from Ashton 
B. Carter, EXCOM Co-Chair, Deputy Sec’y of Def. & John D. Porcari, EXCOM 
Co-Chair, Deputy Sec’y of Transp., to Lawrence E. Strickling, Assistant Sec’y for 
Commc’ns and Info. (Jan. 13, 2012) (on file with authors).  EXCOM is the 
Executive Steering Group of the Interagency National Executive Committee for 
Spaced-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing.  See also Petition for 
Reconsideration of the U.S. GPS Industry Council, ET Docket No. 10-142, June 30, 
2011 (for reconsideration on the 2011 MSS ATC R&O on the Radionavigation-
Satellite Service (“RNSS”) and commercial GPS). 
7
 This type of interference is called “overload.” Complaints regarding this type of 
overload interference asserted, inter alia, that LightSquared's planned LTE network 
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Immediately, the FCC stated that it was suspending LightSquared’s 
ATC authorization, and that it would revoke the agency’s 2004 ruling 
creating it.
8
  Three months later LightSquared declared bankruptcy.
9
  In 
2014, at the time of this writing, the firm remains mired in financial 
restructuring efforts and all work to construct a new LTE network is halted.  
The smoldering wreckage of the scuttled nationwide network provides a 
thematic logo for the process of spectrum rights definition at the FCC. 
Even senior FCC officials were stunned by the sudden regulatory 
reversal.
10
  The LightSquared LTE network promised to deliver at least an 
order of magnitude more economic value than would be lost by resulting 
interference to GPS.  A well-ordered rights assignment in the GPS band 
could not only fully protect GPS users, including mission-critical tasks 
using GPS devices, but also improve wireless services available to those 
parties.  In other words, whatever gains were achieved by the GPS interests 
lobbying against LightSquared’s ATC venture came at a price that turned 
the great majority of GPS users into net losers. 
This “non-market failure” resulted from the manner in which legal 
rights to spectrum use were defined and assigned.  In Garret Hardin’s 
terminology, it is a “tragedy of the commons.”11  When many parties use a 
                                                                                                                       
would violate the FCC's requirements for "ancillary" use of the ATC. See, e.g., 
LightSquared Subsidiary LLC Request for Modification of its Authority for an 
Ancillary Terrestrial Component, 26 F.C.C. Rcd. 566, 576–77, 585–87 (2011) 
(SAT-MOD-20101118-00239) (order and authorization) [hereinafter Authority 
Modification Request]. LightSquared responded by correcting complainants' 
overestimates of L Band use by the proposed LTE network, and by offering to 
slowly expand LTE network use of L Band frequencies while spending up to $50 
million replacing government GPS units. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
8
 Press Release, FCC, Statement from FCC Spokesperson Tammy Sun on Letter 
From NTIA Addressing Harmful Interference Testing Conclusions Pertaining to 
LightSquared and Global Positioning Systems (Feb. 14, 2012), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-312479A1.pdf. 
9
 Kary & Bathon, supra note 3. 
10
 Blair Levin, chair of the National Broadband Task Force (2009-2010) at the 
FCC, summarized the regulatory outcome this way:   
Something extraordinary happened last week.  Our country reallocated 40 
MHz of commercial spectrum.  No Notice of Proposed Rulemaking from 
the FCC.  No notice and comment period.  No economic analysis.  Not 
even a legal decision stating that that is what we are doing. 
Blair Levin, Remarks to the Minority Media & Telecom Council (Mar. 8, 2012), 
available at http://broadbandandsocialjustice.org/2012/03/when-an-roi-500-times-
better-than-goldman-isn’t-enough-reallocating-our-focus-on-reallocating-spectrum. 
11
 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 5  
 
resource, but none exercise effective control, a commons is said to exist.
12
   
Michael Heller refined the concept, in this context, to a “tragedy of the anti-
commons.”13  Lee Anne Fennell, providing a synthesis, shows the problem 
to be a generic “common interest tragedy.”14  In this paper, we elect to add 
further to terminology creep by dubbing the situation a tragedy of the 
regulatory commons. 
The primary alternative account frames the “LightSquared 
debacle”15 as an arcane dispute over highly technical measures of radio 
interference.
16
  It is that complexity, the nature of the beast in busy wireless 
markets deploying advanced technologies, that is said to cause the 
frustrating, anti-social outcome.  In particular, some spectrum experts 
suggest that, because the engineering requirements for radio equipment —
—specifically, GPS receivers—are not sufficiently defined by regulators, 
                                                     
12
 This is in fact loose terminology, in the sense that, were a group of owners 
actually vested with “common” ownership rights, they would have incentives to 
organize their efforts so as to protect against resource dissipation.  A corporation, a 
classic commonly owned resource, does this through governance institutions. It 
should also be noted that Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” portrayed, in fact, the 
breakdown of an “open access” situation where no ownership rights, common or 
private, were in effect. 
13
 Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:  Property in the Transition 
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) [hereinafter Heller, Tragedy 
of the Anticommons]; HELLER, GRIDLOCK ECONOMY, supra note 1. 
14
 Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. L. REV. 907 (2004). 
15
 Cecilia Kang, FCC Treading Lightly After LightSquared Debacle, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 15, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-02-15/business/35445855 
_1_falcone-fcc-decision-fcc-officials. 
16
 See, e.g. J. Pierre De Vries, Optimizing Receiver Performance Using Harm 
Claim Thresholds, 37 TELECOMM. POL. 9 (2013) (“The monetary scale of the 
problem is difficult to quantify, [but] it is large,” with the FAA estimating 
consumer value from LightSquared’s plan to be “at least $70 billion” while 
LightSquared estimated the value at $120 billion; Vries states next that “these 
numbers are not strictly comparable, and [they] both can be questioned as being 
self-interested.”); Jon Brodkin, Why LightSquared Failed: It Was Science, Not 
Politics, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 19, 2012, 9:00pm EST), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2012/02/why-lightsquared-failed (“In the end, though, it was not politics, but 
the results of repeated tests which the FCC could not ignore, that thus doomed 
LightSquared.”); David Schneider, LightSquared’s GPS-Interference Controversy 
Comes to a Boil, IEEE SPECTRUM (Jan. 27 2012, 17:58 GMT), http://spectrum. 
ieee.org/telecom/wireless/lightsquareds-gpsinterference-controversy-comes-to-a-
boil (“But more levelheaded engineers have also scrutinized the problem in detail, 
and the technical issues appear to be understood well enough to suggest possible 
work-arounds.”). 
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the border between the L Band and the GPS Band was murky.
17
  They point 
to this lack of technical specificity as the heart of the problem, the solution 
lying in greater diligence by regulators to define precisely what constitutes 
“harmful interference.”18  Proposals are being made, for instance, to begin 
more careful government regulation of GPS receivers, prohibiting the 
production and sale of cheaper models that are susceptible to quality 
diminution from traffic in neighboring frequencies.
19
  The idea is that, by 
forcing the market to produce better-performing, if more expensive, radios, 
regulators will face less pressure to protect existing users from 
transmissions generated by entrants within—or across—allocated bands.20   
The simple answer to this proffered solution is that FCC regulators 
already have authority to set receiver standards, but yet continually move to 
protect “sub-standard” radios when politically prompted to do so.  The 
deeper answer is that regulators, even with perfectly reliable enforcement, 
do not know the value produced by emerging services or the costs imposed 
on existing ones.  The trade-off between better, higher-cost receivers and 
more intensive sharing of spectrum between services is not evident.  The 
receiver rules regulators issue are ill-informed guesses at the socially 
optimal result. 
The real lesson learned from the LightSquared debacle is contained 
in the simple logic of “tragedy of the anti-commons,” laid out elegantly in 
law professor Michael Heller’s work,21 in the economics of Nobel Laureate 
James Buchanan and Yong Yoon,
22
 and elsewhere.
23
 Those asserting the 
LightSquared-GPS dispute is a narrow technical matter miss the forest for 
                                                     
17
 See Stephen Lawson, LightSquared vs. GPS Raises Big Spectrum Issues, PC 
WORLD (July 25, 2011, 2:30 PM), www.pcworld.com/article/236501 (citing experts 
discussing the receiver issues). 
18
 LightSquared opponents pointed to the ATC licenses’ provisions prohibiting 
“harmful interference,” provisions common to all FCC wireless licenses, as cause 
for revoking the ATC licenses. See infra text accompanying note 70. In so doing, 
they ignored the even more prohibitive language that the FCC has used to describe 
the use of unlicensed devices, including GPS receivers. Such radios cannot cause 
interference and “interference must be accepted that may be caused by the 
operation of an authorized radio station.” 47 C.F.R. § 15.5(b) (2010); 47 C.F.R. § 
25.131 (2013).  As a licensed service, LightSquared would have transmitted via 
such “authorized radio station[s].” 
19
 See NTIA Letter, supra note 6, at 6–7 (planning new work that would serve “as 
the basis for standards for the development and procurement of GPS receivers”). 
20
 De Vries, supra note 16. 
21
 Heller, Tragedy of the Anticommons, supra note 13; HELLER, GRIDLOCK 
ECONOMY, supra note 1. 
22
 James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies, Commons and 
Anticommons, 43 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2000). 
23
 Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U.L. REV. 907 (2004).   
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the trees. What appears to be a technical conflict is actually an economic 
conflict that is difficult to resolve and virtually impossible to solve 
efficiently, because of the legal rules in place. Different rules made to 
advance rather than hinder economic bargains could have enabled welfare-
improving cooperation and avoided the costly collapse of a mobile 
competitor. Moving wireless markets forward to grasp the enormously 
robust opportunities for wireless technologies in the 21
st
 Century requires an 
understanding of the anti-commons paradigm, its application to current 
regulatory quagmires, its solution via observed regulatory successes, and 
strategies for reform. Although tragedy occurred in the LightSquared 
debacle, it is possible to transition administrative spectrum use rules 
towards effective, economically nimble rights, which would allow 
consumers, carriers, investors, technologists, and entrepreneurs to cooperate 
for mutual advantage in creating and operating advanced wireless networks. 
Such positive outcomes are observable in other “interference” disputes, 
making it essential to understand how these contrasting results are achieved 
by policy makers. 
In this article we explore the LightSquared-GPS conflict and 
identify the circumstances creating the regulatory commons. Given that 
interference effects are symmetric in nature, we explain why a focus on 
technology specifications is misplaced and why proper rights definition will 
do more to maximize production from spectrum assets. We show that, 
because LightSquared and its L Band neighbors had expanded rights and 
the ability to bargain, the firm overcame serious interference with 
immediately adjacent rivals—parties with more intense “technical” 
interference issues to overcome than those separated across bands.  We then 
describe how terrestrial mobile license (called commercial mobile radio 
services, or “CMRS”) are liberally defined to approximate private property, 
and how these de facto spectrum ownership rights facilitate cooperative 
resolution of interference disputes.  In LightSquared’s dealings with satellite 
(and L Band) licensee Inmarsat, as with CMRS licensees’ transactions, legal 
rights are defined so as to accommodate market reallocations. These 
examples suggest a policy framework that would optimize wireless market 
productivity, and avoid LightSquared- type debacles in the future. 
I. LIGHTSQUARED, LTE, AND GPS RECEIVERS  
 Under the Radio Act of 1927, government manages frequency 
access, restricting specific wireless deployments so as to pre-empt “harmful 
interference.”24 However, as Ronald Coase pointed out long ago, the 
                                                     
24
 See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast 
Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133 (1990); Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, 
the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline 
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interference problem is not one-way, but is symmetric.
25
 The excluded 
activities also have value, and suppressing them to protect other activities 
carries a cost to society. Put differently, rules to mitigate “harmful 
interference” simultaneously create “harmful interference” through lost 
output. 
The social optimum is achieved via the mix of services that entail 
the highest total output (equivalently, the smallest “interference loss”). 
Regulators, however, do not internalize the costs or benefits associated with 
the relevant options.  Moreover, they have strong incentives to remedy 
conflicts by avoiding political backlash, typically by placating influential 
incumbents.  The general result is widely observed, with the vast majority 
of spectrum resources being overly restricted and under-utilized. 
Meanwhile, productive wireless services, more valuable by orders of 
magnitude than the services “protected,” are pre-empted.  Regulators 
themselves admit this unfortunate outcome, expressing frustration over the 
system’s inability to shift bandwidth from under-used employments to 
emerging wireless applications of far greater social significance.
26
  
 
                                                                                                                       
to Ronald Coase’s ‘Big Joke’: An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 15 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 335 (2001); Thomas W. Hazlett & Sarah Oh, Exactitude v. 
Economics: Radio Spectrum and the ‘Harmful Interference’ Conundrum, 28 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 227 (2013). 
25
 R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 
(1959). 
26
 For example, in the FCC’s National Broadband Plan issued March 2010: 
The current spectrum policy framework sometimes impedes the free flow 
of spectrum to its most highly valued uses . . . .  In several instances, [the 
NTIA and FCC] assign large quantities of spectrum to specific uses, 
sometimes tied to specific technologies. . . . [B]ecause mission needs and 
technologies evolve, there must be a public review process to ensure that 
decisions about federal and non-federal use that may have worked in the 
past can be revisited over time. . . . In the case of commercial spectrum, 
the failure to revisit historical allocations can leave spectrum handcuffed 
to particular use cases and outmoded services, and less valuable and less 
transferable to innovators who seek to use it for new services. 
NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at 78–79; see also  PRESIDENT’S 
COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT:  REALIZING 
THE FULL POTENTIAL OF GOVERNMENT-HELD SPECTRUM TO SPUR ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 16 (2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ 
files/microsites/ostp/pcast_spectrum_report_final_july_20_2012.pdf (2012) (“[W]e 
have created a fragmented partitioning of spectrum that has led to artificial scarcity 
and constraints on future uses.  Because of this history, legacy spectrum 
assignments remain overly restrictive . . . .”). 
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A regulatory commons occurs here because of the nature of the 
rights granted to, or withheld from, licensees.  By authorizing the use of 
millions of GPS devices in the spectrum adjacent to the L Band, 
authorizations that lack the coordinating guidance of agents other than 
regulators, the FCC virtually ensured that future attempts to reallocate 
spectrum in this frequency neighborhood would prove contentious and 
difficult.   
A. Conflict on the L Band-GPS Band Border  
The dispute over the new LightSquared 4G network was not 
triggered by LTE emissions that would spill into the GPS band, but by the 
simple fact that the quiet L Band—hosting virtually no traffic, for very few 
subscribers, under satellite-only rules—would become much noisier when 
busy serving millions of terrestrial mobile voice and broadband data 
subscribers.  Many GPS receivers have been built to analyze not just signals 
emitted in the authorized GPS band but signals traveling through the 
adjacent L Band.  As Julius Knapp, chief of the FCC Office of Engineering 
and Technology, stated in congressional testimony, “In effect, we 
discovered that some GPS legacy equipment effectively treats the GPS 
spectrum and the L-Band spectrum as one band.”27  These emissions are an 
informational bonus that GPS radios use to fine-tune their locational 
estimates for objects or addresses.  With greatly increased traffic in the L 
Band, as per the deployment of LightSquared’s LTE network, this bonus 
would be lost and the service supplied by certain GPS receivers diminished. 
The GPS market can be broadly grouped into two categories.  In the 
mass market GPS receiver segment there exist tens of millions of GPS 
receivers in smartphones, automobiles, and GPS radios (produced by 
companies like Garmin or Tom Tom).  These applications are not terribly 
sensitive to small changes in accuracy; a left turn will not be missed due to 
a six-inch mapping difference.
28
  Thus, the cost of “L Band interference” 
                                                     
27
 The LightSquared Network: An Investigation of the FCC’s Role: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. On Energy & 
Commerce, 112th Cong. (2012) [hereinafter LightSquared Hearing] (joint written 
statement of Julius P. Knapp, Chief of FCC Office of Eng’g & Tech., & Mindel De 
La Torre, Chief of FCC Int’l Bureau) available at democrats.energycommerce. 
house.gov/sites/default/files/image_uploads/Knapp.De%20La%20Torre.Testimony.
pdf. 
28
 Consumer GPS devices are typically accurate to within 10 to 50 feet. How 
Accurate is GPS?, GPS BASICS, http://www.gps-basics.com/faq/q0116.shtml (last 
visited April 8, 2014); see also Kevin Fitchard, Analysis:  Sorting Out the 
LightSquared GPS Interference Mess, CONNECTED PLANET (July, 18, 2011, 8:55 
PM), http://connectedplanetonline.com/3g4g/news/analysis-sorting-out-the-
lightsquared-gps-interference-mess-0718 [hereinafter Fitchard, Sorting].  The NTIA 
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would not likely be significant even absent mitigation techniques. In 
addition, there are approaches available to reduce device impacts to an 
imperceptible level. For instance, LightSquared offered to use only the 
lower half of the L Band, those frequencies located furthest (in frequency 
space) from the GPS Band, for several years.
29
  Then, as the LTE network 
scaled up in size, the additional 20 MHz closest to the GPS band would be 
deployed.  This temporal lag would allow a new generation of GPS radios 
to be deployed, and these radios would include inexpensive filters that 
eliminate noise from the L Band.  In general, the small cost to GPS users 
would be more than compensated by the availability of an additional 
nationwide broadband network delivering benefits to GPS users, via 
increased market competition and enhanced bandwidth for mobile high-
speed data service.   
The second category consists of high-precision GPS devices.  
Parties selling or depending on such receivers were the primary source of 
political opposition to L Band LTE.  This category involves a far smaller 
number of receivers, but includes those installed in mission-critical crash-
avoidance systems on passenger airliners and self-guided steering 
mechanisms on tractors and other farm equipment that are accurate to the 
millimeter.
30
  LightSquared estimated that there were 500,000 such 
devices
31
; the Coalition to Save GPS
32
 argued that there exist 750,000 to 
one million.
33
   
To alleviate the most pressing concerns, LightSquared offered to 
replace government GPS units, spending up to $50 million.
34
  The GPS 
parties claimed that that was insufficient to mitigate the potential damage.  
                                                                                                                       
was ambiguous about whether using the lower 10 MHz would affect consumer GPS 
devices.  See NTIA Letter, supra note 6. 
29
 NTIA Letter, supra note 6. 
30
 Fitchard, Sorting, supra note 28. 
31
 Kevin Fitchard, LightSquared, GPS Industry Spar Over Proposed Interference 
Fix, CONNECTED PLANET (Oct. 14, 2011, 5:22 PM), http://connectedplanetonline. 
com/3g4g/news/lightsquared-gps-industry-spar-over-proposed-interference-fix-
1014 [hereinafter Fitchard, Spar]. 
32
 Over 70 companies or trade associations are listed as members on the Coalition’s 
website. Coalition Members, COALITION TO SAVE OUR GPS, http://saveourgps.org/ 
coalition-members.aspx (last visited April 7, 2014). They include UPS, Tom Tom, 
Southwest Airlines, FEMA, Garmin, John Deere & Co., Caterpillar, the National 
Association of Manufacturers, Delta, Fed Ex, Aircraft Owners and Pilots 
Association, and the American Rental Car Association. Id. 
33
 Fitchard, Spar, supra note 31. 
34
 Press Release, LightSquared, Statement by Jeff Carlisle, Exec. Vice President for 
Regulatory Affairs & Pub. Policy at LightSquared (Oct. 27, 2011), available at 
http://www.lightsquared.com/press-room/press-releases/statement-by-jeff-carlisle-
executive-vice-president-for-regulatory-affairs-and-public-policy-at-lightsquared. 
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The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) released a study in 2011 that 
estimated the FAA’s retrofit costs alone to be drastically higher—about $6 
billion.
35
   In addition, the FAA also estimated that adjusting its forthcoming 
NextGen air traffic control system
36
 for L Band LTE conflicts would lead to 
800 deaths over ten years and raise NextGen costs by $60 billion.
37
 
Opponents of the LTE network included not only the FAA, but also 
the U.S. Department of Defense and a wide array of other parties with 
investments, products or operations in the GPS Band.
38
  The Coalition to 
Save Our GPS was not bashful about stating its expected cost of mitigating 
interference from LTE use of the L Band.  The organization estimated the 
costs—just to government agencies—of an astounding $245 billion.39  
This estimate massively overstates the social cost of L Band LTE 
network interference.  In the political arena, interested parties have strong 
incentives to emphasize the negative consequences of policies they oppose.  
The FAA’s cost estimate for the NextGen delay, for example, implausibly 
exceeds the market capitalization of the entire U.S. passenger airline service 
industry.
40
  We also know these estimates are excessive because when the 
                                                     
35
 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., LIGHTSQUARED AVIATION IMPACTS 6 (2011), available 
at http://www.insidegnss.com/pdf/07122011_FAA_-_LightSquared_Aviation 
_Impacts.pdf [hereinafter FAA REP]. 
36
 NextGen is a multibillion dollar upgrade to navigation systems on airlines, 
largely replacing radar-based systems with more precise GPS-based systems.  
Ashley Halsey III, FAA to Equip Some JetBlue Planes With NextGen GPS 
Technology, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2011, at A1.  The FAA cost estimates arise from 
re-planning the GPS systems and infrastructure investments, which total $17 
billion.  It is not clear to the authors, in the FAA’s letter to the FCC, where the 
remaining $42 billion in costs arise.  See FAA REP, supra note 35, at 6. 
37
 FAA REP, supra note 35, at 6. 
38
 See, e.g. Authority Modification Request, supra note 7, at 576-77, 585-87. 
39
 Press Release, Coalition to Save Our GPS, Sampling of Dep’ts and Agencies 
Shows $245 Billion Potential LightSquared Impacts on GPS in Fed. Gov’t Uses 
Alone (Oct. 27, 2011), available at http://www.saveourgps.org/pdf/government 
_cost_estimates.pdf. 
40
 As of early 2013, the estimated market cap of the industry was around $50 
billion. See generally GOOGLE FINANCE, http://www.google.com/finance (last 
accessed on Feb. 21, 2013) (providing values for certain airlines, including Delta-
Northwest Air Lines at $11.66 billion, Southwest-AirTran Airlines at $8.55 billion, 
United-Continental Air Lines at $8.79 billion, American Airlines at $8.00 billion, 
US Airways at $2.20 billion, JetBlue Airways at $1.72 billion, Alaska Airlines at 
$3.57 billion, Spirit Airlines at $1.40 billion, and SkyWest-ExpressJet at $0.71 
billion); YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/ (last accessed on Feb. 21, 
2013) (providing similar values).  These airlines represent nearly 90% of market 
share (domestic revenue passenger miles). See generally RESEARCH & INNOVATIVE 
TECH. ADMIN., BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, http://www.transtats.bts.gov/. (last 
viewed Apr. 7, 2014) 
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Coalition to Save Our GPS opposed the LightSquared’s grant of ATC 
authority, they cited an estimate that the new licenses permitting 
LightSquared to provide LTE were worth $10 billion in total.
41
   
Simple Coasian analysis establishes this valuation as a cap on costs 
to GPS users.  In his famous 1960 essay, “The Problem of Social Cost,”42 
Ronald Coase explained that the cost of any “harmful effect” is the loss in 
output it incurs.  That loss, in turn, is bounded by the most efficient (least 
costly) mitigation technology.  In this instance, the Coalition defines the 
upper limit of the cost of LTE interference to GPS as $10 billion.  Were the 
costs of LTE interference above that amount, the mobile licenses could be 
purchased by affected GPS parties and the spectrum held vacant, 
eliminating the burden.  
Of course, the Coalition to Save GPS did not present its estimate of 
the ATC licenses as bounding the costs of interference, but to support its 
assertion that liberalization of LightSquared’s satellite licenses extended an 
unjustifiable windfall: 
All in all, LightSquared’s proposal represents a new low in financial 
engineering at the expense of the U.S. taxpayer.  Never before has a 
single company tried to gain so much from our national spectrum 
resources and pay so little for the collateral damage caused by its 
plans.
43
 
The outraged assertion is ironic.  The GPS Coalition was aiming to have a 
$10 billion windfall not extinguished, say by auction to the highest bidder, 
but transferred to GPS interests in the form of an FCC license cancellation.  
That transfer is what they claimed would best protect their economic 
interests.  In the event, regulators obliged them, leading one to muse that 
“never before has a single [industry] tried to gain so much from our national 
spectrum resources and pay so little for the collateral damage caused by its 
plans.”  The policy action created no more than $10 billion in social gain, 
and yet caused easily more than $100 billion in collateral damage.
44
  The 
losses so exceed the gains that it is likely that the welfare of most 
                                                     
41
 Press Release, Coalition to Save Our GPS, LightSquared Did Not Pay For and 
Does Not Have a “Legal Right” to Build a Nationwide Terrestrial Network in the 
MSS Band (Oct. 27, 2011), available at http://www.saveourgps.org 
/pdf/History_Windfall_112611.pdf (“If allowed to go forward, LightSquared gets to 
pocket the $10 billion increase in spectrum value that would result.”) (citing a 
Brattle Group study of spectrum valuation).  
42
 R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
43
 Kevin Fitchard, LightSquared is Jilting Taxpayers Out of Billions, GPS Industry 
Claims, CONNECTED PLANET (Oct. 27, 2011, 2:56 PM), http://connectedplanet 
online.com/3g4g/news/lightsquared-is-jilting-taxpayers-out-of-billions-gps-
industry-claims-1027.  
44
 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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constituent members of the Coalition to Save Our GPS was adversely 
impacted.  The gains from additional cellphone rivalry and mobile data 
network capacity would have reduced prices and expanded opportunities for 
wireless applications.  Excluding this beneficial outcome outweighed any 
plausible gains from reduced interference costs for the vast bulk of GPS 
users.   
B. The Nature of a Regulatory Commons 
One way to protect GPS is to simply banish L Band LTE.  Existing 
satellite phone services use very little of the total capacity of the L Band, 
which is why LightSquared attempted to exploit this unused capacity and 
why, without LightSquared’s LTE network, the L Band would continue to 
be quiet and unassuming.  With so little satellite phone usage, GPS 
receivers may continue to listen in the L Band to marginally improve their 
satellite reception.   
The relative quiet is the status quo, and it signals the generation of 
little social value.  The satellite telephone market has proven an economic 
graveyard, with numerous carriers ––such as Irridium,45 Teledesic,46 and 
Globalstar
47
 declaring bankruptcy. So long as the L Band is regulated under 
rules not allowing for popular, profitable services, it will continue to be an 
excellent buffer for GPS, much like living next door to a vacant lot affords a 
home owner extra parking. But the L Band is one exceptionally expensive 
parking lot. 
The alternative framing of the issue—one where LightSquared is 
interfering with GPS devices, and the government must act to stop that 
interference—commits precisely the error that Ronald Coase exposed in 
1959.  This framing fails to understand “interference" as a two-way 
problem, something that should be particularly easy to see in the instance of 
the LightSquared-GPS conflict given that the GPS claim was that 
LightSquared created interference by using the spectrum allocated not to 
GPS but to a neighboring band.  
To illustrate the problem, Mindel De La Torre, chief of the FCC’s 
International Bureau, in a candid internal email, analogized GPS users to 
drivers using the wrong lane in traffic. GPS users, she said, have “been 
                                                     
45
 Arik Hesseldahl, The Return of Iridium, FORBES (Nov. 30, 2011, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2001/11/30/1130tentech.html. 
46
 Sharon Pian Chan, The Birth and Demise of an Idea:  Teledesic’s ‘Internet in the 
Sky’, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 7, 2002), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/ 
archive/?date=20021007&slug=teledesic070. 
47
 Barnaby J. Feder, Globalstar, Bankrupt Satellite Company, to Be Sold for $55 
Million, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/ 
16/business/globalstar-bankrupt-satellite-company-to-be-sold-for-55-million.html. 
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driving in the left lane [LightSquared’s allocated L Band] with impunity, 
but now it looks like the left lane might actually have traffic in it, the GPS 
community is yelling bloody murder.”48 GPS users were able to use the 
adjacent “lane” without conflict when it was lightly used by satellite 
services. The pro-GPS argument essentially is one of detrimental reliance, 
since the rules explicitly state that GPS devices must tolerate interference 
from other licensees. In any event, the end result is mutual interference, but 
the legal fight that followed may have been prevented had the FCC 
allocated spectrum licenses in a sensible way that avoided the tragedy of the 
anti-commons. 
In choosing to resolve the border dispute between LightSquared 
(and its future customers) and GPS users by killing LightSquared’s LTE 
network, the Commission “interfered” with one set of wireless opportunities 
in order to protect another.  It is impossible to exactly quantify the costs and 
benefits in such a situation.  This is the crux of the problem in central 
planning of spectrum (or other) markets. Resource prices (here for 
spectrum) are not readily available and the offers from willing partners in 
market transactions are replaced by bureaucratic edicts, obfuscating demand 
and supply information that would be available from the observation of 
standard economic exchanges. 
The best publicly available information, however, supports the 
claim that the decision to block the LTE network was—by at least an order 
of magnitude—a net loser for society.  LightSquared estimated that its 
network using 40 MHz L Band would generate about $120 billion (present 
value) in consumer surplus.
49
  These projections could be biased upwards, 
however independent valuations of mobile radio spectrum in the U.S. yield 
even higher forecasts—about $200 billion in social welfare (consumer and 
producer surplus).
50
  These benefits from permitting LTE vastly outweigh 
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 LightSquared Hearing, supra note 27, at 32 (questions of Chairman Cliff Stearns, 
Sr.), available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default 
/files/documents/Final-Transcript-OI-LightSquared-Network-FCC-Investigation-
2012-9-21.pdf. 
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 See Daniel Fisher, What’s Falcone’s $4 Billion Gamble on LightSquared Worth 
Now?, FORBES (May 1, 2012, 8:11AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/ 
2012/05/01/whats-falcones-3-billion-gamble-on-lightsquared-worth-now/ (citing an 
economist’s estimate that the LightSquared spectrum was worth approximately $12 
billion and the consumer value around $120 billion).   
50
 This is based on analogizing the 40 MHz of L Band spectrum to 30 MHz of 
generic mobile spectrum, estimated to produce annual social welfare gains of over 
$10 billion.  The annual flow is discounted as a perpetuity at a real discount rate 
equal to five percent to produce a present value.  This employs a model calibrated 
on international mobile market data to value the impact of additional bandwidth on 
prices and voice minutes (using U.S. data for the year 2003).  See Thomas W. 
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the cost of fixing whatever problems were alleged to occur with GPS 
receivers, which were only estimated at about $10 billion by the opponents 
themselves. 
An objection may be raised: that the GPS interests—which are 
numerous, use unlicensed radios, and have non-exclusive rights
51—are 
unable, in practice, to make a serious offer to acquire the L Band licenses.  
Suppose, as a thought experiment, that Delta, Fed Ex, and UPS (three 
members of the anti-LightSquared lobby) were highly motivated to protect 
their GPS receivers from degradation and managed to raise the capital to 
buy the licenses for $10 billion.  These parties could then leave the band as 
is, excluding terrestrial mobile traffic.  This is the acquisition the FCC 
provided, but without charge to the Coalition.   
This objection reveals part of the fundamental issue.  The barrier to 
purchasing the adjacent spectrum for protection is the “free rider problem.”  
The investment by the three firms would silence the source of interference 
for all the users of the GPS band, not just Delta, Fed Ex and UPS.  The 
benefits constitute a non-excludable public good. Hence, it is not likely that 
the three partners would finance such a purchase.  The capital actually 
invested would produce less than the optimal level of protection. 
Switching from thought experiment to real-world conditions, we 
see the character of the regulatory commons.  A cooperative venture to buy 
“interference protection” via L Band ATC licenses is a transactional 
nightmare.  GPS interests are permitted to use the GPS band—and, 
implicitly, the L Band next door—not by the grant of ownership rights but 
via specific use rights.
52
  The “unlicensed spectrum” is governed by 
technical and behavioral rules (including power limits) established by 
regulators; usage rights are non-exclusive and distributed to millions of 
disparate parties.  Moreover, the GPS Band is widely allocated for uses by 
government agencies.  These institutions are prohibited from reassigning 
rights in secondary market transactions.
53
   
The regulatory commons results in the pre-emption of Coasian 
bargaining. This outcome is often referenced as “market failure,” where 
                                                                                                                       
Hazlett & Roberto E. Muñoz, A Welfare Analysis of Spectrum Allocation Policies, 
40 RAND J. ECON. 424, 435-36 (2009). 
51
 See 47 C.F.R. § 15.5(b) (subjecting all such radio use to two conditions: “that no 
harmful interference is caused,” and “that interference must be accepted that may 
be caused by the operation of an authorized radio station, by another intentional or 
unintentional radiator, by industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) equipment, or by 
an incidental radiator”); id. at § 25.131 (2010) (offering limited non-exclusive 
rights). 
52
 Id.   
53
 Id.   
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positive-sum deals cannot be realized due to prohibitive transaction costs.  
But this outcome is conditional on the legal regime.  Specifically, the 
creation and distribution of fragmented, incomplete, and non-exclusive GPS 
Band use rights by the FCC prevented bargaining—a “non-market failure.” 
In distributing fragmented usage rights for spectrum so widely in 
GPS assignments, FCC regulators made market transactions impossible. If 
$1 in damage is inflicted on current users from new services, with the new 
services yielding $1 million in consumer benefits, an intensely productive 
deal still may not be executed, because trade-offs and decisions are in the 
domain of the regulator.  If the interests losing the $1 scream loudly, or are 
located very close to the policy maker’s ear, the social welfare-enhancing 
advance will be thwarted.   
Such sad outcomes do not come to fruition, however, when a carrier 
decides to upgrade its mobile network, say, from analog to digital. Under an 
alternative regulatory scheme, wherein wireless operators enjoy de facto 
spectrum ownership, millions of spectrum users (network subscribers) will 
find that the new devices “interfere” with their radios and, at some point in 
the transition, will render them useless. But social coordination remedies 
this situation. The operator who owns the necessary spectrum rights can 
gently reallocate spectrum from the old service to the new, matching 
supplies with demands, and can distribute new digital phones (marketed as 
“free, with a contract!”) to old customers, allowing them to enjoy 
“interference protection” via an equipment change-out.  Countless such 
conflicts are managed under the constraints of competitive markets, and 
supported by property rights of a workable kind. 
It is noteworthy that the dispute between LightSquared and GPS 
interests was not caused by insufficient specificity in interference contours 
despite that common theme in much of the spectrum policy literature.
54
  The 
rules were actually clear that LightSquared’s LTE network was not to 
distribute out-of-band emissions above specified levels, and that the 
unlicensed devices in the GPS Band would have to accept whatever 
interference licensed devices in adjacent bands might inflict.
55
  The FCC 
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 See, e.g. De Vries, supra note 16, at 757 (2013); Philip J. Weiser & Dale 
Hatfield, Spectrum Policy Reform and the Next Frontier of Property Rights, 15 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 549 (2008). 
55
 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 15.5(b), 25.131 (2010).  Garmin, for instance, stated the rule 
clearly in a 2006 technical document:  “[Garmin GPS devices] must accept any 
interference received, including interference that may cause undesired operation.” 
GARMIN, GPS 15XH/15XL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 1 (2006), available at 
http://static.garmincdn.com/pumac/GPS15xH_15xL_TechnicalSpecifications.pdf. 
TomTom, likewise, declared its GPS devices to be in conformity with 47 C.F.R. 
Part 15., TOMTOM INT’L BV, DECLARATION OF CONFORMITY (Sept. 11, 2009), 
available at http://www.tomtom.com/lib/doc/FCC%20DoC%20-%20START.pdf. 
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simply chose to overrule these regulations on “public interest” grounds, 
which the Communications Act of 1934 generally allows it to do.
56
   
Moreover, the remedy imposed by regulators to the border dispute 
did not add technical sophistication to emission rules, but simply proscribed 
terrestrial mobile services in the L Band.  While implementing the fix 
requested by GPS lobbyists, the FCC extinguished an arguable border 
incursion by slamming a blunt object against the spectrum allocation table, 
removing no more than a $10 billion problem by eliminating a more than 
$100 billion gain.  This did not remedy the “interference,” but greatly 
expanded it. 
The rights assigned to GPS users also made for a poor resolution 
process.  The administrative procedures were opaque.  The relevant 
questions concerning harmful interference were not presented side by side, 
and no objective quantification of the appropriate alternatives was put 
forward by spectrum allocators.  This accommodated a decision in which 
policy makers—regulators at the FCC, as well as powerful members in 
Congress and the Executive Branch—could exercise political discretion.   
This non-transparency derives from the endemic externality 
problem embedded in administrative allocation of a key resource such as 
radio spectrum.  Economic choices—in this case, resolving the conflict over 
how best to use the L Band—are made by administrators who do not 
internalize the costs or benefits of their rulings.  The lack of simple 
accounting is highly illustrative of the nature of the system.  Decision-
makers prefer not to make the alternatives explicit, as that would yield 
information for legal or political challenges, constraining their degrees of 
freedom.   
As Blair Levin, formerly a top FCC policy official who headed the 
National Broadband Task Force in 2009-10, said: 
Through a complicated process—mostly out of the public eye—of K 
St. machinations, inter-agency battles, and congressional pressure, we 
as a country came to the unstated but clear conclusion that the GPS 
industry has a primary right to use the spectrum in the band owned by 
LightSquared.
57
 
The passage is perfectly worded, except for the reference to “the band 
owned by LightSquared.”  As vividly demonstrated, the L Band was not 
owned by LightSquared, which owns only licenses authorizing particular 
activities.  The FCC may extend or revoke such usage rights, according to 
“public interest, convenience or necessity.”  The owners of bankrupt 
LightSquared may have standing to challenge the administrative process in 
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 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (2012).  
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which its use rights were revoked as “arbitrary and capricious,” but it has no 
claim for a violation of its property rights in radio spectrum.
58
   
The protection of incumbent GPS interests was achieved with 
violent policy shifts that opened markets, and then closed them, creating an 
entrepreneurial foray and then crushing it.  Moreover, the policy framework 
took the view that virtually any interference to existing wireless operations 
was to be prohibited, even if the gain from the prohibition was tiny and the 
loss—in blocking, “interfering” with, the new opportunity—was vast. A 
regime that is subject to wild perturbations, as per political influence, 
dangerously threatens those equities and undermines the socially 
constructive incentives they yield.  The message to new entrants following 
the LightSquared debacle is, “Do not invest to create additional wireless 
opportunities, the barriers are too high and, alas, the rulemakers cannot be 
trusted.” 
The blame for the LightSquared debacle does not belong to the 
malfeasance of current FCC personnel.  Neither does the blame belong to 
the villainy attributed to LightSquared’s owners (including the political 
entrepreneur and private equity maven, Phil Falcone.
59
)  There are no 
villains or heroes in the LightSquared debacle, only another instance of a 
recurring tragedy of social disorganization. The essential source of 
misallocation is the creation of a regulatory commons.  With spectrum use 
rights defined in small, fragmentary, non-exclusive slices, economic 
reorganization, responding to new opportunities, is impossible due to 
prohibitive transaction costs.  
II. THE BENEFICIAL ROLE OF SECONDARY MARKETS 
 IN THE L BAND  
Determining which party “caused” the interference is not a question 
competently pursued by government, and the “technical” metrics used to 
inform the question do not answer it.  Indeed, the problems generated are 
symmetric and economic in nature.  Consider this description of the 
LightSquared-GPS dispute: 
                                                     
58
 47 U.S.C. § 301 (“It is the purpose of this chapter, among other things, to 
maintain the control of the United States over all the channels of radio 
transmission; and to provide the use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof 
. . . .”).  Licensees must waive “any claim to the use of any particular frequency or 
of the electromagnetic spectrum . . . because of previous use of the same.” § 304.   
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 Matt Levine, Phil Falcone’s Alleged Piggish Behavior Made Him Some Enemies, 
DEALBREAKER (June 27, 2012, 4:30 PM), http://dealbreaker.com/2012/06/phil-
falcones-alleged-piggish-behavior-made-him-some-enemies; Azam Ahmed, S.E.C. 
Files Civil Charges Against Falcone, DEALBOOK (June 27, 2012, 2:47 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/s-e-c-files-civil-charges-against-falcone. 
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Given that LightSquared is coloring within the lines, it claims that the 
GPS industry should be afforded no legal protection. 
Technically LightSquared is right, though interference was never a 
problem until LightSquared tried to rezone its L-band spectrum from 
satellite to terrestrial use. Even if the FCC were to agree, the 
commission is still in a tough spot since allowing LightSquared’s 
network to go forward could jeopardize consumer, commercial and 
government navigation and location devices across the country.
60
 
Yes, the regulatory choice is perfectly understandable.  That is what 
makes the LightSquared debacle classic, not curious. Some parties will 
have to adjust, with costly actions, to accommodate the new neighbors.  But 
these costs cannot be avoided, and excluding the entrant does not minimize 
the expense.  LightSquared’s investors have already lost $4 billion; 
consumers in aggregate stand to lose orders of magnitude more.  On the 
other hand, an expenditure of less than just $400 million would fix potential 
problems associated with the operation of its (now deterred) LTE network,
61
 
according to LightSquared’s estimates.   
LightSquared may be high or low, but the basic problem is not their 
math.  It is that there is no GPS band owner, de jure or de facto, to bargain 
with.  It lacks a responsible party—one that can be paid to cooperate—with 
which to trade.  It has only a regulator, one pressured by both LightSquared 
and its GPS opponents.  Two of the three sets of parties in this conflict 
resolution process, GPS interests and the regulatory authority, fail to 
internalize the costs and benefits resulting from the decision reached.
62
  It 
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 Kevin Fitchard, LightSquared to FCC: You Owe Us Spectrum, GIGAOM (Mar. 16, 
2012, 12:37 PM), http://gigaom.com/2012/03/16/lightsquared-to-fcc-you-owe-us-
spectrum. 
61
 There is reason to take LightSquared’s estimates seriously.  The firm sank large 
investments in a network that depended on GPS interference issues being resolved; 
it is clear that LightSquared believed that they could be resolved at reasonable cost.  
The $400 million estimate is calculated by adding filters to 500,000 “precision” 
GPS units at a cost of $800 each.  This assumes the high-end, for each filter, of the 
stated price range ($300 to $800 each).  Moreover, LightSquared’s technology 
partner, Patron America, designed a filter that cost just $6.  LightSquared 
committed to providing up to $50 million of such upgrades, at its expense, to 
protect government GPS devices from interference.  Roger Cheng, LightSquared’s 
GPS Fix Could Cost Industry $400M, CNET (Oct. 12, 2011, 4:15 PM PDT), 
www.cnet.com/news/lightsquareds-gps-fix-could-cost-industry-400m. 
62
 Charles Wolf, Jr. elaborates on problems generated by regulatory outcomes 
produced by decision-makers who do not internalize the costs and benefits of the 
choices made: 
Which failure is the greater, nonmarket or market, depends on whether the 
supply distortions created by internalities in nonmarket output are larger 
20 TRAGEDY OF THE REGULATORY COMMONS  [Vol. 13 
 
 
may be hugely expensive to block the LightSquared 4G network, but the 
expense is not felt by the policy makers who chose to block it.  This made 
their obstinacy free to indulge.  Deterring large social gains for mobile 
wireless users presents no opportunity cost to organized GPS interests or the 
FCC, as they are not in a position to capture gains from trade.   
It is not a technical problem that has deterred LightSquared but the 
nature of the property rights held by market participants.  To see this, 
consider that LightSquared had initially encountered severe in-band 
interference problems.  Other licensees in the L Band—notably, satellite 
service provider Inmarsat—supply important public safety, aviation, and 
national security applications.
63
  The L Band channels allocated to these 
licenses were originally “interleaved” with those used by LightSquared 
(also supplying satellite services), creating potentially fatal interference 
challenges were a terrestrial mobile system to be deployed using the 
existing band plan.
64
   
Indeed, under the FCC’s original L Band allocation licensed 
satellite carriers could not provide LTE or other non-satellite services, even 
if license restrictions were dropped, because the tiny bands between 
“interleaved” borders crowded mobile traffic into uneconomically narrow 
lanes.  To overcome this situation, LightSquared offered deals to its fellow 
L Band users. Licenses were swapped and contiguous spectrum bands were 
created under the control of one company or another, LightSquared paying 
its neighbors to cooperate.
65
  Border disputes were eliminated by 
eliminating borders.  
                                                                                                                       
or smaller than the demand distortions created by externalities in market 
output.  
Charles Wolf, Jr., The Theory of Non-Market Failure: Framework for 
Implementation Analysis, 22 J.L. & ECON. 107, 117-18 (1979); see also CHARLES 
WOLF JR., MARKETS OR GOVERNMENTS: CHOOSING BETWEEN IMPERFECT 
ALTERNATIVES (2d ed. 1993). 
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 In 2004, before providing ATC services, Inmarsat had approximately 300,000 
terminals deployed worldwide and delivered voice, fax, intranet, and Internet to 
land-based and maritime users.  Inmarsat to Seek ATC License, PR NEWSWIRE 
(Feb. 15, 2006), http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/news-releases/inmarsat-to-seek-atc-
licence-154031705.html;  see also Jonathan Norris, Inmarsat Super-Charges its 
Mobile Satellite Services Business, APEX EDITOR’S BLOG (June 23, 2012), 
http://blog.apex.aero/ife/inmarsat-supercharges-mobile-satellite-services-mss-
business (describing Inmarsat’s MSS applications). 
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 Mobile Satellite Ventures Subsidiary LLC, 20 FCC Rcd. 9752, 9765-66 (2005) 
(order and authorization). 
65
 Sarah Young & Paul Sandle, Inmarsat’s LightSquared Deal Activated, REUTERS 
UK (Aug. 18, 2010, 4:02PM BST), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/08/18/uk-
inmarsat-idUKTRE67H2W820100818 (“[Inmarsat] said the agreement would 
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A regulatory commons was avoided.  With exclusive rights held by 
a small number of licensees, secondary trading led to a spectrum 
reorganization in 2007.
66
  According to the FCC, this process was critical.  
“Next generation broadband systems require large, contiguous blocks of 
spectrum . . . .  [M]uch of the L-band spectrum will not be suitable for 
broadband without such coordination.”67  Yet, as it played out, “harmful 
interference” that blocked the emergence of an LTE network was remedied 
by Coasian bargains.  By early 2012, the payments from LightSquared to 
Inmarsat had grown to $490 million.
68
  These purchases put Humpty 
Dumpty back together again: 
LightSquared is making significant efforts to rationalize narrow, 
interleaved bands of L-band spectrum, held by several international 
operators, into contiguous blocks that will support next-generation 
broadband technologies for both mobile satellite and terrestrial use . . . 
The Commission has recognized that these types of operator to 
operator arrangements, especially in the L-band, should be encouraged 
and are preferable to “regulations based largely on hypothetical 
cases.”
69
 
In truth, the private agreements also deal with “hypothetical cases.”  
Their real distinction is that they incorporate superior information and 
benefit from improved incentives for decision-makers.  The FCC implicitly 
recognizes that the private ordering – where parties are rewarded for 
making better estimates and executing more efficient deals – outperforms 
rules developed by those with no financial stake in the outcome. 
With the licensees in the L Band, the FCC did not test radios, seek 
more clarity as to the nature of the “harmful interference,” or determine 
what reliability level Inmarsat’s customers would receive due to potential 
“harmful interference” from LightSquared’s operations.  They trusted the 
parties to make efficient choices with respect to these concerns.  It worked.  
                                                                                                                       
enable the companies to carve up their satellite spectrum over North America more 
efficiently,” citing a pay schedule of $81.25 million as an initial payment, with 
$337.5 million over three years, and $115 million per year in phase two, with the 
initial agreement signed in 2007 but activated in 2010). 
66
 Press Release, LightSquared Inc., LightSquared Delivers Notice To Inmarsat 
Triggering Re-Banding Of L-Band Radio Spectrum In N. Am. (Aug. 18, 2010), 
available at http://www.lightsquared.com/press-room/press-releases/lightsquared-
delivers-notice-to-inmarsat-triggering-re-banding-of-l-band-radio-spectrum-in-
north-america. 
67
 Authority Modification Request, supra note 7, at 569. 
68
 Comments in Opposition of LightSquared Inc. at 8, Authority Modification 
Request, 26 F.C.C. Rcd. 566 (SAT-MOD-20101118-00239), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-11-133A1.pdf. 
69
 Authority Modification Request, supra note 7, at 581 (footnote omitted). 
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Not so happy a conclusion obtained, however, with the rights 
distributed in the GPS Band.  The parties alleging LightSquared’s 
deleterious impact on GPS service are numerous, do not possess exclusive 
rights, and are often non-profit enterprises (including government agencies).  
Delaying or deterring productive wireless applications supplied by others is 
not an opportunity cost to these rights-holders. The resulting tragedy owes 
not to issues that can be decided on the basis of engineering data.  As the 
LightSquared tragedy played out, an insightful news report summarized the 
technical information gleaned from government-conducted “harmful 
interference” tests: 
For a purportedly ‘scientific’ report, the technical working group’s 
interference study is extremely self-contradictory. LightSquared and 
the GPS industry reached entirely different conclusions in many of the 
report’s focus areas even though both sides were relying on the exact 
same data and the exact same methodology. 
‘It was clear there were very different interpretations of the data from 
the GPS group and from LightSquared,’ Spirent’s Butler said. ‘What it 
came down to was the definition of harmful interference. The test 
methodology was pretty well worked out. We got good data. But 
without a meaningful common definition for interference, both sides 
reached different conclusions.’
70
 
Indeed, technological information will not answer whether 1dB 
(decibel) loss in the signal to noise ratio (C/N0) is the correct standard to 
use—or 6dB. The former allows for more radiated energy to impact a radio 
receiver under a “no harm, no foul” assumption, the latter less.  The choice 
between the different standards constituted perhaps the key determination in 
the entire matter.  The NTIA choose 1dB as the standard, despite vigorous 
protestation from LightSquared that a 1dB loss had “little impact” and that 
“it is well understood that 1dB loss of C/N0 is a very small fraction of the 
link margin that GPS receivers carry.”71  The “correct” amount of signal to 
noise is not a technical matter but an economic choice: how much is a 
tighter protective shield is worth, relative to its cost?  The government’s 
choice was the loss of a nationwide wireless network.  
III. LIBERAL RIGHTS ASSIGNMENTS MITIGATE THE REGULATORY 
COMMONS FOR CMRS LICENSEES 
The conventional wisdom has built up in the U.S. that spectrum is 
very difficult to define and that interference conflicts are endemic.
72
  But 
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  Fitchard, Sorting, supra note 28. Spirent is a firm that designs and tests wireless 
equipment. 
71
 Comments in Opposition of LightSquared Inc., supra note 68, at A-41. 
72
 Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 54. 
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this view is highly misleading, a product of the manner in which certain 
conflicts are funneled through a political process.   When appropriate 
spectrum use rights are in place, the contentiousness of border disputes 
typically dissolves.  Hence, incentive structures created by FCC spectrum 
rights regimes support—or sabotage—efficient market reconfigurations.  
What we learn is that it is neither possible nor necessary to fully define 
spectrum contours ex ante, that some spillovers are efficient, and that 
optimal interference levels are quickly identified when incentives are 
properly aligned.
73
   
LightSquared’s successful rationalization inside the L Band is not 
unique.  We have seen similar processes in several other markets, most 
notably with respect to CMRS allocations.  When spectrum use rights have 
been distributed to responsible economic agents in the market, conflicts 
tend to be resolved—just as LightSquared was able to “clean up” the L 
Band through private contract.  LightSquared’s plans faltered in a cross-
border dispute where it faced holders of non-exclusive rights, including 
public agencies unable to participate in secondary markets.   
CMRS markets exhibit organizational efficiencies that arise when 
licensees are awarded broad, flexible rights to exclusively control a defined 
radio spectrum space.  Operators are awarded CMRS licenses, a regulatory 
category that subsumes cellular, PCS (Personal Communications Services), 
AWS (Advanced Wireless Services), SMR (Specialized Mobile Radio), and 
700 MHz allocations.  In such licenses, the FCC delegates decision-making 
over services, technologies, business models and network architecture to 
licensees, effectively permitting market allocation of the bandwidth.   
Communications scholars Dale Hatfield and Phil Weiser concede 
the economic success realized in the operation of these wireless markets.  
But they argue that the de facto property rights held by mobile operators are 
not the basis of this success.  Instead, they cite “the technical characteristics 
of PCS services” as uniquely favorable for limiting “harmful interference” 
claims.  Mobile operators serve “large geographic areas” and are 
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 Charla M. Rath, Defining Radio Rights: Theory and Practice 3, in J. Pierre De 
Vries &Kaleb A. Seth, The Unfinished Radio Revolution: Eight Perspectives on 
Wireless Interference, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 501, 528-530 (2011), 
available at http://www.silicon-flatirons.org/documents/conferences/2010.11.12-
862/Rath.pdf. 
Licensees also deal with thousands of instances of interference from 
unauthorized operations each year. Again, licensees’ efforts to resolve 
these issues are very much local and generally do not involve the FCC. If 
we can locate the source of harmful interference, we can often work with 
the owner of the property or transmitter to address the problem . . .  
Id. at 530. 
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“cellularized,” an architecture that generally lowers emission levels (say, 
compared to television broadcasting), making it easier to limit cross-border 
spillovers.  Additionally, markets are served by “stable ‘repeat players’” 
with “considerable incentives for cooperative behavior.”74  Engineering 
professor Charles Jackson agrees, adding that PCS operators also enjoy 
greater autonomy over airwaves because they control both receivers and 
transmitters in the frequencies they use.
75
  
These factors do help explain how CMRS licenses work, but 
inexorably lead to the conclusion that the nature of the liberal rights granted 
responsible economic agents—not special circumstances determined 
exogenously—are key to producing the favorable outcomes seen. 
We begin with the latter point by Jackson.  The nature of the CMRS 
authorization is to cede choices over spectrum use in a given band to a 
given licensee.  The licensee is then free to share access to the allocated 
bandwidth with others; indeed, this is the basic business model that makes 
CMRS licenses worth billions of dollars in the U.S.  But how is this best 
done?  With FCC allocations, exclusive rights are sometimes awarded; in 
other cases non-exclusive, overlapping use rights are authorized, as with 
unlicensed bands.   
The incentive yielded by the broad scope of the CMRS rights is that 
the licensee optimizes the total value of services using the underlying 
spectrum.  This creation of valuable services forms the pool of benefits 
from which the carrier obtains payment.  In particular, the licensee 
constructs and operates networks, retaining control over receivers and 
transmitters.  This vertical integration is dictated by efficiency concerns,
76
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 DALE HATFIELD & PHIL WEISER, CATO INST. POL. ANALYSIS, NO. 575, TOWARD 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SPECTRUM: THE DIFFICULT POLICY CHOICES AHEAD 17 (Aug. 
17. 2006), available at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa575.pdf. 
75
 See Linda Doyle & Tim Forde, Towards a Fluid Spectrum Market for Exclusive 
Usage Rights, in 2010 IEEE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON NEW FRONTIERS IN 
DYNAMIC SPECTRUM 620, 628 (April 2007), available at 
http://www.tara.tcd.ie/bitstream/2262/23959/1/TowardsAFluidSpectrumMarket.pdf 
(describing comments by Jackson). 
76
 Licensees like Verizon or AT&T rely on markets to supply much of the mobile 
ecosystem, of course.  The technology and infrastructure are developed by such 
firms as Qualcomm, Nokia, or Alcatel-Lucent; handsets by Apple, Samsung, 
Blackberry or Sony-Ericsson; application platforms by the Apple App Store, 
Google Play or Windows Store; and a virtually limitless array of edge providers—
from Wikipedia to Ancestry.com to Twitter—supply content.  That ownership of 
CMRS licenses is inevitably integrated with the ownership of the mobile network 
departs from this decentralized structure.  In general, the carrier sinks considerable 
capital to construct and operate a mobile platform upon which an ecosystem may 
evolve, retaining control over both spectrum and core physical network 
infrastructure.  Rival service providers and subscribers share these assets, but by 
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flowing from the licensee’s incentive to optimize spectrum access and so 
maximize resource value.  In CMRS networks, thousands or even millions 
of mobile devices are emitting and receiving signals—why such networks 
are built in the first place.  Such traffic creates endemic compatibility issues 
and potential interference.  The emissions or downloads of any one user can 
negatively impact the cellphone performance of many others.   
CMRS operators respond to such challenges in systematic ways, 
even as competitive innovations are continually introduced in the rivalry 
between platforms.  First, carriers assiduously avoid splitting control over 
spectrum and network resources.  Indeed, it is seen that, as Jackson says, 
“handsets are part of the network.”77  This drives not only integrated control 
of spectrum and infrastructure, but strong carrier coordination of what 
devices are permitted to use the network (setting standards, testing and 
certifying devices). In short, that there is unified coordination of networks 
and end user devices is a product of the property rights regime. Second, 
carriers employ prices to protect high-valued applications by excluding low-
valued access.  “Bandwidth hogs” are free to use networks, but they must 
pay for the privilege. With both equipment authorizations and pricing 
menus, carriers maximize by effectively coordinating access across all 
“transmitters” and “receivers.”78   
                                                                                                                       
purchasing bundled services (spectrum access plus network access) rather than 
“naked” spectrum or network elements.  This structure allows the carrier to 
coordinate highly complementary inputs, mitigating transaction costs and strategic 
hold-up.  See Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical 
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. 
& ECON. 297 (1978); Thomas W. Hazlett, David Teece & Leonard Waverman, 
Walled Garden Rivalry:  The Creation of Mobile Network Ecosystems, GEO. 
MASON U. L. & ECON. RES. PAPER SERIES NO. 11-50 (2011).  
77
 Charles L. Jackson, Wireless Handsets Are Part of the Network, in Skype 
Commc’ns S.A.R.L., Opposition Brief of CTIA – The Wireless Association, Fed. 
Commc’ns Comm’n Doc. No. RM-11361  app. C (April 30, 2007), available at 
http://files.ctia.org/pdf/Comments_CTIA_Skype_Opposition_Complete_43007. 
pdf. 
78
 Howard A. Shelanski & Peter W. Huber, Administrative Creation of Property 
Rights to Radio Spectrum, 41 J.L. & ECON 581 (1998). 
We have already suggested that ‘spectrum’ consists of a licensee's right to 
send signals from a transmitter to a receiver at a specified power and 
frequency. A ‘complete’ bundle of property rights in spectrum must 
include the ability to close off the output end of that conduit, not just to 
control the input end. The owners of the TransAlaska Pipeline, for 
example, would not be said to enjoy full property rights if they were free 
to pump oil in at the Prudhoe Bay head-end but not to control who takes 
oil out at the Valdez terminus. It would similarly be of little service for a 
DBS operator to carry a subscription programmer's material if parties 
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Third, mobile operators invest continually to upgrade technologies, 
expanding network functions and capacities.  Cellular networks in the U.S. 
have advanced from 1G to 2G to 3G to 4G since the mid-1990s without any 
government mandates to do so.  Along the way, mobile carriers (also 
without mandate or directive) introduced whole new services such as 
texting, push email, and broadband access, hundreds of new devices 
(netbooks, tablets, and smartphones), and hundreds of thousands of mobile 
applications.
79
 Each network upgrade involves a delicate balancing act, 
protecting existing services and subscribers, while accommodating new, 
potentially interfering uses.   
These improvements would, if directed by the FCC, constitute 
“spectrum reallocations.”  The fact that airwaves can be deployed in new 
networks or used to support innovative services is a product of the liberal 
use rights extended in the CMRS license.  Markets—or, “secondary 
markets,” since the initial FCC assignments are being rearranged by 
transactions between private firms—are thus able to create new ownership 
structures.  The outcome of this trading process could be extreme 
fragmentation resulting in the costly border disputes seen in so many 
wireless markets.  But the for-profit firms holding liberal licenses avoid 
such wealth-dissipating tragedies.  The observed market structures reflect 
this strategic interest in maintaining an optimal level of control—far from 
total, as seen in the robust nature of the evolving, decentralized marketplace 
(see Figure 1), but designed to be sufficient to keep spectrum resources 
from being squandered.   
                                                                                                                       
other than the paying subscriber were free to demodulate the signal.  The 
right to exclude is accordingly recognized by courts as ‘one of the most 
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as 
property.’ 
Id. at 601. (citation omitted); see also Doyle & Forde, supra note 75.   
79
 Alternatively, in broadcast television, where TV licensees do not control 
spectrum and TV receiver sets are unlicensed devices regulated by the FCC, 
vertical disintegration is mandated.  Television networks, despite benefiting when 
their viewers receive clearer signals and improved content, have no pragmatic 
means—apart from government mandates—of upgrading technology.  The digital 
TV transition officially took over two decades (1987-2009) and—most 
importantly—kept spectrum bottled up in an outmoded delivery platform, terrestrial 
broadcasting, that costs society far more than it delivers in economic gain.  Thomas 
W. Hazlett, Unleashing the DTV Band: A Proposal for an Overlay Auction, 
Comment to the FCC, in NBP Public Notice No. 26, Comment to the  Fed. 
Commc’ns Comm’n., GN Docket No. 09-47, 09-51 & 09-137 (Dec. 18, 2009), 
available at http://mason.gmu.edu/~thazlett/pubs/NBP_PublicNotice26_DTV 
Band.pdf. 
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Fig. 1.  Stylized Structure of the Mobile Ecosystem
80
 
Hence, the large degree of integration observed in mobile markets 
is an endogenous outcome of the liberal spectrum rights regime.  Rather 
than being dictated by the cellular technology, it is the result of rational 
choices made by properly incentivized economic agents.  Indeed, this 
ownership structure is so central to the success of the market that it appears 
to be inseparable from the cellular technology itself.  The “large geographic 
areas” for CMRS coverage areas that Hatfield and Weiser cite as special 
circumstances, for example, are a product of license consolidation by 
bidders in FCC auctions as well as secondary market transactions, not 
regulatory fiat.  U.S. regulators notoriously fragmented rights, in fact.
81
  The 
total number of mobile licenses issued by the Federal Communications 
Commission exceeds 50,000.
82
  These rights have created four or five 
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 This rendition was created by Luma Partners, a U.S. investment banking firm. 
Mobile LUMAscape, LUMA PARTNERS LLC, http://www.lumapartners.com/ 
lumascapes/mobile-lumascape (last accessed April 14, 2014). 
81
 Whereas countries in the European Union, for example, routinely award national 
licenses, the FCC divvies America into 734 local franchise areas (for Cellular 
Market Areas, or CMAs) and 174 Economic Areas (EAs) for the primary license 
maps used.  Together with the even more fragmented license rights issued in 
Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR) and then brought into the cellular market as per a 
1990 liberalization. 
82
 In July 2003, a count of mobile licenses totaled 51,597.  Thomas W. Hazlett, Is 
Federal Preemption Efficient in Cellular Phone Regulation?, 56 FED. COMM. L. J. 
155, 193 (2003). Since that time the FCC has held auctions for AWS, in which 
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national wireless networks—depending on how one counts—through 
merger.   
 This aggregation process deserves special attention.  The creation of 
thousands of CMRS licenses by U.S. regulators imposed substantial costs 
on the market due to the importance of economies of scale and scope in 
mobile networks.
83
  In simple terms, 734 small cell-phone systems using a 
given swath of spectrum, but with different coverage areas,
84
 have costs 
substantially higher than one cellular system using the same spectrum but 
with nationwide coverage.  In economic terms, the adjacent networks are 
highly complementary assets, and combining them into common ownership 
better coordinates production, generating large efficiencies.  Or, from the 
opposite perspective: to the extent that the regulatory license map is not 
adjusted by secondary market transactions, there would exist massive and 
pervasive “interference” between licensees, each of whom is blocking the 
scale economies that are possible to exploit.   
This economic interference from excessive fragmentation translates 
directly into radio interference.  When allocations are intentionally de-
concentrated by policy makers, extra borders are created in spectrum space.  
It is over the rules governing these borders that interference disputes are 
waged.  A significant portion of the economies of scale that accrue from 
secondary market transactions of CMRS licenses, then, owe to the 
elimination of such spillovers.  When firms sharing a contentious border 
combine, integrating assets under one owner, spillovers are eliminated; the 
new firm maximizes the total value of the combined spectrum.
85
 But this 
useful process of rights aggregation via secondary market transactions can 
                                                                                                                       
1,087 licenses were sold (in 2006), and 700 MHz, in which 1,090 licenses were 
sold (in 2008). See Auction 66 Advanced Wireless Services (AWS-1), FED. 
COMMC’NS COMM’N, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm (follow “66: 
AWS-1” from drop-down menu under “Go to an Auction:” at upper-right corner of 
page) (last reviewed/updated on Dec. 1, 2010); Auction 73 700 MHz Band, id. 
(follow “73: 700 MHz Band” from drop-down menu under “Go to an Auction:” at 
upper-right corner of page) (last reviewed/updated on June 19, 2012). 
83
 Brokerage fees in cellular license transactions in just one year (1991) were 
estimated by the FCC to total about $190 million. WIRELESS TELECOMMS. BUREAU, 
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, THE FCC REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SPECTRUM 
AUCTIONS 8 (1997) available at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/data/ 
papersAndStudies/fc970353.pdf. 
84
 Two cellular licenses were issued (by lottery) in each of 734 local license areas in 
the 1980s.  See Federal Communications Commission website: http://www.fcc.gov/ 
encyclopedia/cellular-service. 
85
 Harold Demsetz made this important point for externalities. Harold Demsetz, 
Ownership and the Externality Problem, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, 
CONFLICT, AND LAW 282 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003).  
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only occur when regulators have defined ownership sufficiently to support 
such activity.  
 Cellularization, another supposedly unique cause of harmony in 
CMRS cited by Hatfield and Weiser, is an architectural choice made by 
owners of liberal licenses.  One advantage of the approach is to allow lower 
power levels to be used in handsets, which need to send signals only to 
nearby base stations, enabling networks to re-use channels from cell to cell.  
To the degree that cellularization reduces spillovers, its adoption is again 
endogenous to the incentives yielded by the liberal license, not an artifact of 
the technology.   
Indeed, where liberal licenses are lacking cellular systems have 
been involved in some of the bitterest and most intractable FCC interference 
disputes in history—for example, the LightSquared debacle.  
LightSquared’s ill-fated LTE network was cellular and its emissions well-
behaved, conforming to border limits as set by the FCC.  Another example 
involving low-power cellular emissions was the years-long Nextel-public 
safety dispute over the use of 800 MHz frequencies. This episode has been 
singled out by Hatfield and Weiser as illustrative of the failure of markets in 
handling spillover problems.
86
   
First, this directly contradicts the claim that cellular technology 
yields harmony, as the Nextel system accused of causing interference was a 
cellular network.  Second, the dispute was a direct product of the fact that 
the public safety agencies complaining about radio interference were 
governmental entities unable to participate in secondary market 
transactions. 
Third, the solution to the interference dispute which the FCC 
implemented mimicked secondary market mergers. The Commission 
enacted a “spectrum swap” wherein Nextel traded cash ($4.8 billion) plus 
its licenses to access spectrum adjacent to police and fire department bands, 
in exchange for a CMRS license using bandwidth removed from its 
neighbors.  The reason that such a transaction had to be imposed as a 
“spectrum swap” by regulators was that the parties Nextel had to transact 
with—public safety organizations—were barred by law from buying or 
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 “[C]oordination and possible relocation costs—or other transaction costs (such as 
developing clear legal entitlements)—may be too formidable to be addressed 
through private market arrangements.” Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 54, at 573.  
For a recent case where the FCC stepped in to coordinate a relocation of a set of 
incumbent licensees to avoid adjacent channel interference, see Improving Public 
Safety in the 800 MHz Band, 19 FCC Rcd. 21818 (2004) (report and order).  
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selling licenses.  It took the FCC a decade to create a facsimile of this 
market process.
87
 
Finally, consider cross-border disputes that remain, even after 
mergers have aggregated the vast majority of licenses and eliminating all 
but a handful of borders.  As Weiser and Hatfield note, the interference 
between mobile operators is not an issue of regulatory concern, given that 
the “stable, repeat players” prefer to settle these issues privately.   But 
“stable, repeat players” could not themselves avoid the Nextel and public 
safety conflict. Between CMRS licensees, in contrast, interference 
mitigation is pro forma.  As Charla Rath, an executive with Verizon 
Wireless, describes it, 
Under current rules, licensees negotiate to extend rights into each 
others’ licensed spectrum on a daily basis. These are not massive, 
onetime negotiations between companies, but involve hundreds of 
individual negotiations between companies’ engineers who are tasked 
with the day-to-day operations of the network.
 88
 
The policy key to the observed harmony: “under current rules.”  
These rules give (a) exclusive domain to profit-maximizing carriers over 
spectrum use, yielding incentives for optimization; and (b) yield flexibility 
to those licensees, allowing them to adjust operations so as to mitigate 
border incursions without seeking administrative waivers or otherwise 
engaging regulatory agents.  In this environment, gains from trade are 
regularly effectuated, with efficient solutions to conflicts serving the 
interests of all.  More to the point, running to regulators, which would 
replace such bargaining with FCC rulings, is seen as expensive, time-
consuming, and inefficient relative to the alternatives.   
In a specific instance relayed to one of the authors by an 
engineering consultant, Nextel complained to Verizon, circa 2002, about 
interference it was receiving from the latter’s base stations using 800 MHz 
(cellular) bands next door to frequencies allocated to Nextel’s SMR 
licenses.  While Verizon was complying with FCC rules, not technically 
creating impermissible “harmful interference,” it nonetheless agreed to 
install new filters on its base stations.  Nextel paid for the filters, and may 
have provided additional compensation.
89
  Such settlements avoid 
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 See Hazlett & Oh, supra note 24.  
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 See Rath, supra note 73, at 529 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 24.236 (2008) (permitting 
field strength agreements in PCS, AWS and 700 MHz), 27.55(a) (permitting private 
agreements in AWS 1 and 700 MHz), and id. at § 22.912 (permitting cellular 
licensees to agree on service area boundary extensions)). 
89
 This episode was relayed to Thomas Hazlett by an RF engineer who had, during 
this period, served as a consultant to Nextel and, at other times, has worked at the 
FCC.     
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regulatory overhead and are common within the wireless industry.
90
  This is 
a product not of CMRS technologies, but of the assignment of efficient 
rights bundles to responsible economic agents who internalize the costs and 
benefits of engaging in contentious dispute resolution—or avoiding it—at 
the FCC.
91
  
CMRS is exceptional, not because of any given technical or 
economic aspect of the service, but due to the expansive, flexible nature of 
the use rights awarded the licensee.  These rights are distinct from the 
narrowly-specified use permits authorized in a traditional FCC wireless 
license, and—like LightSquared was able to do in the L Band ——enable 
profit-seeking enterprises to merge, trade, partner, or otherwise create 
financial structures that bring the incentives of rival parties into alignment.   
CONCLUSION 
LightSquared faced two challenges in turning virtually worthless 
“satellite spectrum” into highly valued “LTE spectrum.”  The first was that 
the satellite licenses they owned were allocated “interleaved” channels, 
mixed in with channels licensed to other satellite operators in the L Band.  
These narrow channels made the provision of mass market mobile services 
quite impossible, because modern cellular systems use much larger channels 
for efficient operation.  Although the total bandwidth available in the 
designated “satellite” L Band was sufficient to support such operations, 
regulators had prevented it through a band plan imposed years earlier. 
LightSquared (and its predecessors) straightforwardly dealt with 
this problem. LightSquared negotiated bargains with the other licensees, 
most importantly Inmarsat, and rationalized ownership rights.  Putting the 
Humpty Dumpty L Band back into continuous spectrum blocks was 
expensive but necessary in order to deploy a competitive terrestrial mobile 
network.  Through license trades and monetary payments LightSquared 
successfully reconfigured L Band spectrum into contiguous blocks, one of 
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 Rath, supra note 73, at 529. 
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 Cellular systems are themselves subject to tragedy of the regulatory commons 
when rights are held by regulators rather than responsible economic agents.  The 
“harmful interference” problems associated with cellular systems turned into years-
long logjams at the FCC.  The first cellular allocation, in fact, took somewhere 
between 11 and 43 years, depending on how one establishes the end points.  
Cellular technology was developed at Bell Labs in 1946.  In 1968 the FCC opened 
a formal proceeding to allocate spectrum for the service.  In 1984-89 the 
Commission issued about 1,468 licenses, mostly by lottery, for each of the two 
systems it authorized across 734 CMAs.  The FCC’s National Broadband Plan 
summarized the regulatory delay as lasting from 1970 to 1981, or 11 years.  See 
NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 5, at 79. 
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which they controlled.  With the FCC’s liberalization of usage rights via an 
ATC, LightSquared undertook to construct a modern 4G network. 
 However, an issue of cross-border interference then arose.  The 
highly fragmented and incomplete rights that GPS users had been awarded 
created a regulatory commons.  In technical terms it was far less prohibitive 
than the issue of L Band interference, because LightSquared’s LTE 
operations would not transmit over the ostensibly established border.  The 
conflict arose because radios in the neighboring GPS band “listened in” to 
the L Band and would be potentially confused by rising noise levels there. 
Whatever the damage to the GPS services from LTE in-band interference, 
the dollar cost was outweighed by the benefits to mobile wireless customers 
enjoying the benefits of an additional nationwide broadband network.   
Regardless of the modest scale of the actual radio conflict, the 
political conflict proved intractable. Users of the GPS band possess non-
exclusive use rights, using radios approved by the FCC under unlicensed 
device rules.  Powerful interests with significant operations in the band, 
including the Federal Aviation Administration and the Department of 
Defense, are public agencies.  The organizations are unable to participate in 
secondary market transactions, and their executives would not financially 
benefit from such activities even if they were.  Bargaining broke down.   
The GPS “commons” is protected by regulators, agents incentivized 
to craft rules that reflect political concerns.  The resulting equilibria, as seen 
throughout the history of FCC regulation, disproportionately favor 
incumbents and may impose large net costs on society. With the regulatory 
commons, under-allocation of spectrum, squandering valuable wireless 
services, is the norm.   
Conversely, with flexible, exclusive spectrum rights assigned to 
responsible economic agents, markets can efficiently structure and re-
configure ownership rights.  Border disputes are largely mitigated via 
merger (eliminating the borders themselves), pre-empted by the vertical 
coordination of networks and the devices that use them, or via network 
adjustments arranged by profit-maximizing agents.  The performance of this 
system, seen primarily by CMRS licensees but also in LightSquared’s L 
Band rationalization, is so strikingly superior to the failures endemic in the 
regulatory commons that it is surprising that its policy implications are so 
widely misunderstood.  
 Using regulatory forms already implemented, policy makers can 
strategically avoid meltdowns such as the LightSquared debacle by 
avoiding the impractical rights distributions that create them.   While much 
damage has already been done over the past 85 years of allocation under a 
top-down administrative planning model, substantial improvements have 
been demonstrated, particularly in CMRS allocations, and can be more fully 
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employed in other allocations, leading to dramatic improvements in 
consumer welfare.    
Consider emergency radio services. Instead of giving thousands of 
public safety agencies (there are more than 100,000 wireless licenses 
awarded to local fire, police and EMT departments
92
) control over the use of 
specific frequency spaces, taking such spectrum out of any possible 
secondary market restructuring, such agencies can be funded to purchase 
radio services from commercial providers.
93
  These contracts with providers 
could build in redundancy across networks and technologies.  Handsets that 
shift from terrestrial mobile base stations to back-up satellite service when a 
natural disaster knocks out local communications, have long been available 
but have been under-provided to public safety organizations pre-occupied 
with building their own radio networks. 
Important efficiencies are achieved by sharing, running emergency 
applications over commercial networks supported by millions of private 
subscribers.  Agencies, with no comparative advantage in owning or 
operating communications networks, would then be able to focus on 
purchasing the best price-quality package in the market.  Presumably, 
contracts would contain terms for prioritizing traffic; in emergency 
situations, public safety users would have first claim on bandwidth.  The 
present alternative locks in a given amount of spectrum and then directs 
agencies to construct their own network from there.  It makes no more sense 
than shipping police departments specified quantities of auto parts, 
mandating that they use this much—no more, no less—for the construction 
of police cars.   
Spectrum is an input into an output.  It is that output, mobile 
communication, that the government agency needs to consume.  It is 
difficult to know, objectively and from outside an actual situation, how 
much of each ingredient is the right amount to use.  It is impossible to know 
what will be the right amount (or type of spectrum) in the future.  Better to 
let markets configure the inputs, and governments to buy the outputs.  This 
will not cost taxpayers more, but less.  And service will improve.  Not only 
will the receipts from the sale (auction) of liberal licenses be substantial 
when less bandwidth is requisitioned for public safety, government 
purchases will be more transparent and efficient.     
Consider, next, the allocation of unlicensed bandwidth.  Such 
bands, like GPS, are managed by regulators, who establish rules of access.  
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But regulators do not know how much an unlicensed band is worth to 
society relative to the alternative—the same bandwidth allocated to liberal 
licenses, auctioned to the highest bidders.  The information gleaned in the 
market, where resources go to those who value them most highly, is 
truncated when the FCC sets aside spectrum for unlicensed use.  The 
decision to do so invariably turns into a battle between warring corporate 
factions, those who believe their business models will best prosper with one 
type of allocation or the other.   Regulators materially benefit by being the 
locus of such tug-o-wars; they get to exercise their preferences, while 
mingling with those industry executives that they might like to work with 
during post-agency employment, enhancing their human capital.  But the 
economic way to resolve such allocation questions is to let the opposing 
parties bid for bands and deploy them using business models of their 
choosing.  FCC experts elucidate:   
Some special administrative provisions for low-powered devices may 
be efficient in a market system. However, in making decisions about 
the amount of spectrum allocated to unlicensed use, the government 
should face the opportunity cost of limiting or foreclosing other use . . 
. .  Future expansion of dedicated spectrum for unlicensed use could be 
obtained through . . . a licensee . . . charg[ing] manufacturers a fee for 
the right to produce and market devices to operate in that band.
94
 
The government, the public, and competing interests jockeying for 
policy should know what opportunity costs are associated with rival 
choices.  Just as land is distributed to decentralized property owners, with 
governments then acquiring resources to supply public parks, spectrum 
allocated for unlicensed operations can be markedly improved by the use of 
market prices.  When choices are made to use given frequencies in one 
manner versus another, the prices made to secure that outcome reveal the 
value of the alternatives sacrificed.  This crucial accounting is what is 
sacrificed in top-down allocations that effectively force bureaucrats to make 
trade-offs uninformed by market data and heavily influenced by political 
pressure.  Exhibit A: the LightSquared debacle.    
Unlicensed bands are often, in fact, analogized to public parks
95
 by 
advocates arguing for more such allocations.  But the implications of the 
analogy are the reverse.  Land resources are not bottled up in case-by-case 
allocations with the state choosing between parks or other real estate 
deployments.  Instead, resources are generally made available to the market 
via private ownership rights.  Trading then takes place, prices are revealed, 
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and transactions divert resources into their most highly valued 
employments.  These can and do include public parks, with taxpayers, 
voters, interest groups and policy makers forced to confront the associated 
opportunity costs.  This not only improves initial allocations, and speeds 
resources into productive use, but removes the hidden costs of lock-in via 
regulatory commons.   
Such costs are routinely ignored in the spectrum allocation process, 
which continues to create legal regimes—such as the TV White Spaces 
proceeding, ongoing since 2002 and still mired in rulemakings and trials
96
 
—that force the government to make allocation choices without the benefit 
of competitive spectrum valuations.  Policy makers believe that certain 
business models, such as local area networks commonly supported in the 
use of unlicensed spectrum (as with WiFi, cordless phones, or baby 
monitors) cannot be accommodated without government issuing non-
exclusive spectrum use rights.  They are mistaken.  Not only can liberal 
licenses support local networks (where devices come “plug ‘n’ play” from 
the electronics vendor, no wide area network carrier needed), as suggested 
by FCC analysts themselves, the FCC has previously authorized band 
managers to help coordinate unlicensed users.
97
   
Without the property rights necessary to utilize secondary markets, 
future opportunities for enhanced wireless communications will have less 
chance for success.  When regulators consider alternative legal regimes in 
initial spectrum allocations, this is a vital, if overlooked, factor. The 
extraordinarily high social costs of just one tragedy of the regulatory 
commons, as demonstrated by the elimination of LightSquared’s 4G 
network, reveal the magnitude of the error made when the costs of rights 
fragmentation are ignored by policy makers. 
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